CHAPTER 14

COLORADO



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Census Bureau

Despite repeated efforts by the legislature, activist governors, and citizen initiatives, Colorado has consistently failed to impose statewide growth management policies. Meanwhile, the state's fiscal and legislative capacities to manage growth have weakened. At the local level, efforts to achieve smart growth have had short-term success in maintaining a desired quality of life, but communities have now run up against their own limits largely because of growth beyond their jurisdictional control.

Since the early 1990s Coloradans have turned increasingly to voluntary regionalism as a more productive middle ground for achieving smart growth objectives. Whether this course will prove effective is far from clear, but the regional scale is perhaps the only level at which diverse and conflicting political and economic interests can work out their differences over future growth in the state.

STATE PROFILE

Colorado is the country's eighth largest state in land area and the highest in altitude, with 54 peaks over 14,000 feet. More than a third of its land, primarily in the mountainous western part of the state, is federally owned.

With 4.67 million residents in 2005, Colorado ranked twenty-second in the nation by population, but it is the second most populated state in the Intermountain West (following Arizona). Although Colorado is a state of wide-open spaces, more than 80 percent of residents live along the Front Range—a 200-mile long, 40-mile wide band that follows the eastern edge of the Rockies and stretches from Pueblo in the south to Fort Collins in the north. The Denver–Boulder metropolitan area is home to about two-thirds of the Front Range population. Only about 15 percent of state residents live west of the Front Range, while the remainder lives on the sparsely settled eastern high plains.

Compared with U.S. averages in 2005, Coloradans are somewhat younger (34.7 years old versus 36.4), whiter (72 percent versus 66 percent), more affluent (median household income of $48,198 versus $44,684) and better educated (36 percent are college graduates versus 27.2 percent). Hispanics make up a larger share of the state's residents (19.5 percent versus 14.5 percent), while African-Americans made up a smaller share (3.6 percent versus 12.1 percent).

Throughout much of its history, the Colorado economy was driven by boom-and-bust cycles in the mineral extraction industries. During the oil shale bust of the 1980s, mining employment dropped by 53 percent and construction employment by 29 percent. Today, however, tens of thousands of new gas wellheads are popping up across the western part of the state, and oil shale development appears to be poised for another surge.

After the 1980s bust, the state diversified into the advanced technologies sector, where employment tripled between 1970 and 2000. Mountain-based tourism also has expanded greatly, reaching $8.2 billion in 2006. While Colorado ranks second in the nation in its share of college graduates, it stands forty-eighth in terms of public support for higher education.

GROWTH CHALLENGES

Since 1970 Colorado's population has nearly doubled from 2.2 million to 4.3 million. At 30 percent, its growth rate between 1990 and 2000 ranked third in the nation. Migration from other states—most significantly California—accounted for over half of population growth during the decade. Another 38 percent reflects natural increase (excess of births over deaths).

Mobility is falling behind population growth. In the Denver metropolitan area, traffic delays due to congestion more than tripled between 1982 and 2003, making the region the sixteenth most congested in the nation (Schrank and Lomax 2005). The Colorado Springs area also experienced a significant increase in congestion. In 2004 voters approved the $4.7 billion FasTracks program that will build 119 miles of light and commuter rail lines in metropolitan Denver within 12 years.

Increased highway congestion, at least in part, reflects urban sprawl. In 2000 the average Denver area driver had a commute of 21.56 miles. The average density of housing built during the booming 1990s was 2.19 units per acre—less than half that of previously developed residential areas. Colorado Springs had somewhat higher density urban development over the same period (2.61 units per acre), but exurban development was about half as dense (0.46 acres per capita versus 0.26 acres) (Hecox, Holmes, and Hurlbutt 2005). In general, sprawl is increasing more rapidly at the southern end (Colorado Springs–Pueblo) of the Front Range. By 2025, the Denver–Boulder–Greeley region is projected to rank fifth in the nation in terms of sprawl (Burchell et al. 2002).

Another study predicts that by 2030 the highest rates of urban fringe and exurban development will be in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, followed closely by Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, Oregon and Washington (Berube et al. 2006). In Colorado, exurban development is fueled by owners of second homes and by people willing to trade off an hour or more commute each way for a home in a rural setting. By 2000, the state had five of the nation's ten most rapidly growing counties, three of which (Archuleta, Park, and Custer counties) are not contiguous to a major metropolitan area (U.S. Census Bureau 2002a).

POLITICAL HISTORY

Every Colorado governor in the last four decades has made some attempt to establish growth management standards. In general, Republican governors have stressed enabling acts while Democratic governors have stressed grassroots engagement. Both approaches recognize and work within the strong home rule traditions of the state (see Appendix 14).

LOVE ADMINISTRATION, 1963–1973

Efforts to manage growth began in the 1960s when the population climbed by more than 25 percent. In the early 1970s, activist Republican Governor John Love and a cooperative legislature worked to address public concerns about the impacts of growth. In 1973 the Colorado Senate passed a bill (SB 377) that would have established statewide land use and environmental protection requirements patterned after those enacted in Oregon, but the measure failed when the House and Senate versions could not be reconciled.

Although several bills won passage the following year after Love left office, their strategic approach was essentially to enable local governments to engage in planning with some minimal standards and virtually no state enforcement. The Local Government Land Use Control and Enabling Act granted counties and municipalities the authority to plan and regulate the use of land, although as a practical matter charter home rule municipalities already enjoyed this authority under Article XX of the Colorado Constitution.

Another bill (SB 35) required that all counties establish ordinances controlling new subdivisions with regard to minimum standards for water, sewage, soils, and fragile geologic conditions. It also enabled counties to require dedication of land and/or money for parks and school sites (DeGrove 1984). If a county failed to develop such regulations, the state Land Use Commission (established in 1970) was empowered to do so. Even though counties were required to have subdivision ordinances, they could exempt certain developments and they had no authority over subdivisions on parcels of 35 acres or more.

A third bill (HB 1041) enacted in 1974 gave two state agencies—the Land Use Commission and the Department of Local Affairs—the authority to regulate development of "areas and activities of state interest," defined as mineral resources; natural hazards; natural, historical, or archeological sites; and other key facilities. In theory, the Land Use Commission could make proactive use of the powers in HB 1041 to override the local permitting of a land use in such areas. In practice, however, the state role is supportive rather than directive: that is, it should assist local governments to identify, designate, and adopt guidelines for administration of matters of state interest. Since its passage, local governments have applied their HB 1041 powers primarily to challenge developments permitted by other local governments that would have a spillover effect on uses in their jurisdictions (Wallis 1992).

LAMM ADMINISTRATION, 1975–1987

Democrat Richard Lamm was a member of the legislature when Governor Love was attempting to shape growth management. Lamm rose to statewide prominence in 1972 because of his opposition to Colorado's hosting of the Winter Olympics. Although Denver had already received the award, the opposition—lead by the Colorado Open Space Council—succeeded in cutting off public funding for the games and forced the city to cancel its hosting. Lamm ran for governor in 1974, winning on a platform that emphasized environmental protection based on responsible development regulations.

In September 1976, Governor Lamm issued an executive order identifying the ten goals of his Human Settlements Policy. State agencies were to use the policy in distributing state and federal funds for projects over which they had some regulatory authority. For this strategy to succeed, Lamm had to secure the cooperation of his executive agencies as well as win the confidence of local governments. But aside from the Department of Local Affairs, large agencies were slow to respond to the governor's directive. As for local governments, the Colorado Municipal League professed neutrality, while the association of counties was aggressively opposed to the idea. Republican leadership in the legislature accused the governor of grossly exceeding his authority and attached provisions to budget bills that would effectively require the governor to halt the initiative.

The Human Settlements Policy was still under attack by legislators and county commissioners when Lamm launched two additional initiatives: the Front Range Project and the Blue Ribbon Panel on Infrastructure Financing. The Front Range Project, unveiled in January 1979, consisted of meetings in communities up and down the urban corridor from Fort Collins through Denver to Colorado Springs. The objective was to involve citizens and local interests in developing visions for future land use in their communities. Eventually these visions would be woven together into a regional plan. By December 1980, Lamm announced that he was rescinding his Human Settlements Policy and the Front Range Project soon collapsed as well.

At the same time that Governor Lamm was trying to establish elements of growth management, the Colorado Legislature had its attention focused elsewhere. Taxpayer revolts in Massachusetts and California were generating initiatives to limit property tax increases in those states, and Colorado's Republican leadership felt that it needed to take action. In 1977 the legislature passed a statutory limit on the annual increases in General Fund appropriations. The initial limit was 7 percent per year. Since inflation was strong at that time, the 7 percent cap restrained spending in real terms.

In 1982 the State Constitution was amended, again in an attempt to mute growing resentment against property tax increases during a period of recession. The Gallagher Amendment, a referendum from the legislature, reduced assessments on residential property from 30 percent to 21 percent while capping the statewide residential share of property tax collections at 45 percent. It also reformed the property tax by exempting some types of personal property and strengthening state oversight over local assessment practices.

ROMER ADMINISTRATION, 1987–1999

Former State Treasurer Roy Romer was elected governor in 1986. During his first two terms, Governor Romer focused on reviving the state's economy. It was not until his bid for a third term in 1994 that he adopted a smart growth agenda. The state's economy was robust by then, and the Democratic governor sensed renewed popular concern over the effects of rapid growth. During his reelection campaign, Romer (1994) authored an article for the *Denver Post* describing the bottom-up process that he hoped might yield a statewide plan.

> Each community needs to create its own vision of how it wants to look in 50 years. Communities [will] then coordinate their plans with neighboring cities and towns, resulting in a regional vision. . . Then, "like patches in a quilt," the regional visions will be sewn together into a state plan. In order to realize these visions, state agency policies may need to change, for example, bringing their service areas into alignment with how regions have been defined.

Romer's initiative took the form of a statewide growth summit in January 1995, attended by 1,000 delegates chosen to represent the greatest diversity of interests. Meetings were then conducted in eight regions. Sensing little chance for working with the legislature, Romer followed up not with legislative proposals but by establishing a blue ribbon panel on transportation. The panel projected a $13 billion shortfall in transportation infrastructure funding over the next 20 years. It recommended a multimodal approach to satisfying transportation demand and at least $6 billion in increased taxes and fees to pay for the improvements. Although a petition drive succeeded in getting the issue on the ballot in 1997, the initiative failed to win voter approval.

Meanwhile, the citizen initiative process was used to further limit the state's ability to deal with the fiscal impacts of growth. The TABOR Amendment, the so-called Taxpayers' Bill of Rights, won passage in 1992 (James and Wallis 2004). At that time, it was unclear what impacts TABOR would have. Indeed, because the state's economy was robust, no obvious effects were felt for years. But the recession in 2001–2003 revealed the significance of the TABOR restrictions for the first time. When viewed in light of these subsequent effects, the legacy of the Romer years was negative in terms of preparing Colorado to manage growth. TABOR in particular reduced the fiscal capacity of state and local governments to deal with the impacts of growth.

During this period, one initiative that successfully advanced a smart growth goal was a constitutional amendment establishing the Great Outdoors Colorado Trust Fund. Half of the proceeds of the Colorado Lottery provided sole funding for the trust. A portion of the trust's funds can be awarded for open space planning grants. Governor Romer saw those funds as potentially providing ongoing support for collaborative regional planning. Consistent with general citizen support for preserving open space, Colorado ranked first in the nation between 1999 and 2004 in the value of voter-approved open space bonds and tax measures (Trust for Public Land 2005).

OWENS ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2007

Despite Governor Romer's preference for a bottom-up growth strategy, some of the strongest supporters of his smart growth summit were disappointed that it failed to result in legislation. Shortly after Romer left office, a new initiative made its way onto the ballot. If passed, Amendment 24 would have established rigorous comprehensive planning requirements for local government, including a consistency requirement. Zoning variances would have to conform to comprehensive plans, and a majority of voters would have to approve any substantial variance. Developers strongly opposed the so-called Smart Growth Amendment, characterizing it as a "bloated bag of verbiage" (Brown 2000). Voters apparently agreed with the opposition since the initiative received only 30 percent approval.

Following defeat of Amendment 24, Republican Governor Bill Owens announced that he would make growth management a high priority. Indeed, when the legislature failed to make adequate progress on the issue, the governor called two special sessions. Although several new laws were enacted, their thrust was in line with Governor Love's initial efforts, enabling local governments to employ tools for planning on a voluntary basis. For example, a new law enabled and clarified the use of impact fees to pay for the costs of new developments. In addition, an Office of Smart Growth was established within the Department of Local Affairs to help promote voluntary adoption of smart growth practices.

While Colorado's strategy has been to rely on voluntary local and regional efforts, the initiative process has had the effect of weakening both state and local government capacity to respond to growth. Most notably, changes to the state tax structure provide strong incentives for local governments to compete for commercial development.

REGIONAL COLLABORATION

To former Governor Lamm, the real challenge was not so much managing growth within communities as between communities (Sanko 1994). As a result, Colorado provides several examples of voluntary regional collaborations designed to manage growth.

The most noteworthy of these efforts is the Denver Region Council of Governments (DRCOG) *Metro Vision 2020*, which included the *Mile High Compact*. That agreement established a voluntary growth boundary covering the six-county area that is home to more than 60 percent of the state's population. Other elements of *Vision 2020* call for reinforcing spines of development along transit corridors, with stations located so as to reinvigorate established commercial centers. Passage of the $4.7 billion FasTracks bond initiative in 2004 also provided significant support for the implementation of *Vision 2020*.

On the south end of the Front Range, the City of Colorado Springs is working with El Paso County and Fort Carson to create a joint sustainability plan. To the north, Larimer and Weld counties have signed voluntary agreements to help assure that their cities do not sprawl into one another. Many of the counties along the I-70 corridor through the western part of the state have also developed a variety of cooperative agreements addressing aspects of growth. Together, these collaborative efforts cover areas that house 90 to 95 percent of Colorado's population.

Regional and collaborative approaches also have been pursued in environmental areas. The state's brownfields mitigation program, established under former Governor Romer, is based on voluntary public-private agreements. In addition, pollution control in three major watersheds in the state employs a cap-and-trade system for users within the basins. Large water storage and transmission projects typically involve local intergovernmental agreements.

Whether the regional-scale voluntary approach that has been evolving for more than 20 years will be able to manage Colorado's growth is an open question. While the state could step in to formally enable these efforts, most observers believe that advances can continue simply on the basis of intergovernmental agreements. These agreements could be strengthened, however, by tying them to future transit improvements and especially to the development of water storage and supply infrastructure. The state could play an enabling role in these areas by, for example, aligning its agency district boundaries with settlement patterns and fostering collaborative planning among those agencies. In addition, the tax and spending constraints imposed by TABOR must ultimately be addressed given that they threaten to undermine long-term collaboration.

Colorado provides an interesting example of an alternative approach to growth management. In a state averse to top-down decision making, bottom-up voluntary planning is attempting to achieve most if not all the objectives of smart growth. Local efforts are coalescing at a regional scale in the form of voluntary collaborations. While such an approach is clearly vulnerable to dissolution, especially if trust between participants is violated, top-down systems may be no less vulnerable. To increase their legitimacy and respond in a more flexible manner to different conditions across a state, top-down systems are often developed with and/or evolve from a strong regional implementation focus. In effect, both bottom-up and top-down approaches to smart growth seem to be converging on a regional scale in Colorado.

GOVERNMENT ROLES

As the preceding political history makes clear, Colorado currently has no statewide system for growth management. Instead, the state's approach has largely been to create a toolbox of planning powers that local governments can adopt. The few mandatory requirements often reflect federal requirements devolved by the state to local or regional jurisdictions. State agencies offer fairly modest technical support for planning. For example, the Office of Smart Growth has an annual budget of only $4 million.

This is not to suggest an absence of planning in Colorado. Far from it. There is a great deal of regulation, although largely the result of local initiatives. Recognizing this, the state has created several programs designed to work as voluntary partnerships and/or incentive programs.

- *Colorado Wetlands Partnership* is a voluntary incentive-based partnership to protect wetlands. Since its inception in 1997, the program has preserved or restored more than 210,000 acres of wetlands and over 200 miles of streams.

- *Colorado Voluntary Clean-up and Redevelopment Act* (CRS 25-16-301 through 25-16-311) encourages owners of contaminated properties to clean up and reuse their sites.

- *Greater Outdoors Colorado*, established through a citizens' initiative and funded by the state lottery, provides grants for the acquisition and planning of local open space.

In addition, two agencies—the Colorado Division of Housing and the Colorado Housing Finance Authority—make resources available to local governments that want to provide low-income housing. Tax incentives were established in 2000 (HB1302) to encourage developers to build low-income rental housing.

REGIONAL PLANNING

Colorado is divided into several types of planning regions (e.g., for economic development) that operate independently of one another. To the extent that these regions carry out federally mandated planning functions such as long-range transportation planning, those responsibilities have largely devolved to the regional level with little state review or technical support. Any coordination across regions is largely voluntary, such as the attempt by the metropolitan planning organizations covering the Front Range to coordinate some of their long-term planning. Local governments can also join together voluntarily to establish regional service authorities.

Although there is no mandatory regional planning requirement, provisions for planning do exist in areas of critical state interest (enacted under HB 1041 in 1974). Local governments primarily use these powers to protest a land use permitted by an adjacent jurisdiction that would have a negative impact on their own jurisdictions.

LOCAL PLANNING

Under Colorado Revised Statutes, counties and municipalities with a certain population level or growth rate must prepare and adopt a master plan. The Department of Local Affairs annually calculates which local governments meet certain growth thresholds, and receives plans for advice and comment. A recent survey by the department's Office of Smart Growth (2006) suggests that all threshold communities have met the master planning requirement.

Nevertheless, the state has no authority to approve plans or to enforce recommendations. In addition, since Colorado has no state or mandatory regional plans, there is no consistency requirement. In fact, the state does not mandate internal consistency with local comprehensive plans. In effect, such plans are advisory and presumed to be modified when zoning is amended. Similarly, the state does not require that local capital improvements—including those by school districts, utilities, or other units of local government—be consistent with local plans.

SMART GROWTH OUTCOMES

Despite the lack of a statewide policy, Colorado acts like a smart growth state. Most of what has been achieved is through local initiative, often supported but not directed by state law. As such, it is useful to compare Colorado's performance with that of its smart growth counterpart, Oregon.

GROWTH PATTERNS AND TRENDS

From 1982 to 1997, Colorado and Oregon stand out as having smaller increases in land consumption (i.e., less sprawl) than any of the other case study states. In Colorado, 88 percent of the population lived in 5 percent of the census tracts. The state also had the highest level of concentration in terms of both employment and housing, while density of development in rural areas remained low throughout the period.

This pattern is also evident in Denver, which had the highest concentration of population of all the metropolitan areas considered. (Portland was ranked next.) Over the 1990s, however, Denver did not do as well as Portland in maintaining the concentration of either housing or jobs. Over the decade, land in the metro area was developed at half the density of previously urbanized land.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

A key measure of environmental quality used in this study is the rate at which resource lands are converted to urban use. Between 1982 and 1997, resource lands in both Colorado and Oregon decreased by 2 percent—less than in any of the other smart growth states. Even when adjusted for population change, Colorado's loss rate was slightly less than that in either Oregon or New Jersey. The state also had one of the largest increases in private conservation lands during the period. At the same time, though, Colorado experienced the largest decrease in farmland of any of the case study states.

TRANSPORTATION

From 1983 to 2003, Colorado ranked third in congestion growth out of the seven states considered, indicating modest performance. Colorado was also the only state without a smart growth program that showed a significant improvement in the share of commuters using public transit during the 1990s. In fact, the increase in ridership in very high density counties was larger than in two of the states with smart growth programs (Florida and Maryland).

AFFORDABLE HOUSING

During the 1990s, median home values in Colorado nearly doubled, increasing at almost twice the national average. Over the same period, household income continued to rise in line with housing costs. Although median gross rents (adjusted for changes in household income) rose more rapidly during this period, the change was only 1.1 percent. As a result, housing affordability in Colorado did not change significantly over the decade from 1990 to 2000.

FISCAL DIMENSIONS

In 2000 Colorado ranked twenty-first in the nation in terms of its state personal income tax rates, thirtieth in terms of its local property tax rate, and forty-fifth in terms of its corporate income tax rate. Even so, the legislature and voters have passed significant constraints on taxes and spending (James and Wallis 2004). In 1977 the legislature enacted the Arveschoug–Bird statute imposing a 7 percent limit on annual growth in the state's General Fund. Five years later, voters approved the Gallagher Amendment, immediately reducing the assessment ratio for residential property from 30 percent to 21 percent. In 1992 voters also approved a citizen initiative, the TABOR Amendment, which further restricted the ability of state and local government to raise revenues.

As a result, government spending between 1992 and 2004 fell 27 percent relative to the state's total economy. These fiscal constraints help explain why Colorado was the only state without a smart growth program that did not increase its aggregate revenues more than aggregate expenditures. It ranked second (behind New Jersey) among the eight case study states in terms of the ratio of revenues to expenditures; when calculated on a per capita basis, Colorado ranked first. In addition, the change in the ratio of the property tax to the tax base was only 0.1 percent between 1992 and 2002—the second lowest rate of change in all eight case study states.

REGULATORY PROCESS

Colorado has been described as an entrepreneurial state that enables local government planning while mandating very little. That characterization has remained largely true throughout the period of modern growth management efforts beginning in the late 1960s. More active attempts to manage growth statewide have failed to win support, leaving smart growth efforts to the municipal, county, and more recently, regional levels.

CONCLUSIONS

Colorado is arguably a smart growth state without a comprehensive state-level growth management program. Its performance not only stands apart from the other selected states in this study, but also from several smart growth states—most notably Florida. Part of the reason seems to lie in relatively effective bottom-up self-regulation. In particular, Colorado ranks higher than several smart growth states in the overall extent of local regulation of residential development (Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers 2008).

Regulation in itself probably does not account for Colorado's performance, however. Several powerful market factors seem to interact with and help to stimulate local regulation. One key issue is water. The Front Range, where population is highly concentrated, is a semi-arid region that must pipe water from the western side of the Continental Divide. This requires significant investment, which in turn stimulates a certain degree of cooperation and collaboration.

A second market factor is the desirability of living near the mountains. Although cheaper land is plentiful east of the Front Range, proximity to the mountains is a primary attraction. Finally, federal lands cover 38 percent of the state, most of it in the mountains. Federal lands provide a protected backdrop for the Front Range and restrict urban sprawl to the west. Together these factors have helped to concentrate development activity. In turn, individual communities within the area compete to attract residents and industry, which involves managing land to take advantage of place-based assets.

APPENDIX 14
MILESTONES IN COLORADO LAND USE PLANNING

YEAR	ACTIVITY/LEGISLATION
1963	Colorado Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (repealed, then reenacted in 1979) (CRS 25-7-101 through 25-7-139)
	Colorado Water Quality Control Act (repealed, then reenacted in 1981) (CRS 25-8-101 through 25-8-703)
	Special Districts Enabling Act gives counties authority to approve of the formation of special districts
	Authority to create regional planning commissions cooperatively among local jurisdictions (CRS 30-28-105(1))
1970	State Land Use Commission established with initial responsibilities for management of state-owned lands
1972	Citizen initiative forces the state to withdraw its successful offer to host the Winter Olympics
1973	Failed attempt in the legislature to pass a statewide land use and environmental protection act (SB 377) patterned after Oregon's Growth Management Act
1974	Local Government Land Use Control and Enabling Act formally granted counties and municipalities the authority to plan and regulate the use of land, CRS 29-20-104 amended in 2001); cities already had the powers granted here under Article XX of the state constitution
	Counties required to establish ordinances controlling new subdivisions with regard to minimal standards for water, sewage, soils, and fragile geologic conditions (SB 35)
	Areas of Critical State Interest (HB 1041) provides local governments with the power to challenge developments permitted by other local governments that would have a spillover effect on uses in their jurisdiction
	Poundstone Amendment clarifies restrictions on municipal and county annexation, effectively restricting Denver's ability to annex new territory
1976	Governor Lamm issues his Human Settlements Policy and establishes the Front Range Project; both later rescinded due to strong opposition from the legislature
1977	Arveschoug-Bird statute establishes limit on the annual increases to General Fund appropriations
1979	Blue Ribbon Panel establish to study infrastructure financing, but their recommendations are rejected by the legislature
1982	Gallagher Amendment reduced and then froze the annual percentage increase on residential property tax
1991	TABOR Amendment (proposed through citizen initiative) is passed establishing strict tax and spending limits on state and local governments
1995	Governor Romer convened Smart Growth Summit, but no proposed legislation emerges; Blue Ribbon Panel is subsequently appointed to study infrastructure funding
2000	Amendment 24, an initiative placed on ballot by smart growth advocates, was soundly defeated
2000–2001	Special session of legislature convened by Governor Owens passes CRS 29-20-104.5, clarifying use of development impact fees
	State Office of Smart Growth established with a $4 million budget to help promote the voluntary adoption of smart growth practices